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1 Introduction
I provide an example relating to Proposition 10 of Galeotti et al. (2010),
showing how degree independence is crucial for their result 1 The example
is given by the network in the diagram below and all discussion in Section 2
refers to this network. The payoff functions used in this example are those
of the best-shot public goods described on page 14 of the paper in question.
That is:
vki(g)(xi, xNi(g)) = maxj∈Ni(g)∪{i}{xj} − cxi
where a player receives a good of value unity if he or any of his neighbours
chooses to provide the good (i.e. xj = 1) and incurs a cost of c ∈ (0, 1) if
he chooses to provide the good himself. Strategies σ(ti) give the probability
that any given player of type ti provides the good.
2 Counterexample
Drop the assumption of degree independence. Take the network in our di-
agram. There are 7 types of players: tA to tG. Assume a symmetric de-
creasing monotonic equilibrium exists. In equilibrium it is impossible that
σ(tB) = σ(tF ) = σ(tG) = 0. As σ(tB) ≥ σ(tG) and σ(tF ) ≥ σ(tG) it follows
by monotonicity that σ(tG) > 0. If σ(tG) = 1 it follows from optimality that
σ(tF ) = 0 and thus that σ(tB) = 1. But tB  tA  tC so from monotonicity
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1This example was originally formulated as a counterexample to Proposition 9 of an
earlier version of the paper, Galeotti et al. (2007).
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it must be the case that σ(tA) = σ(tC) = 1, but this contradicts optimality
of A and C’s strategies.
If 0 < σ(tG) < 1 (i.e. G randomizes over actions) then G is indifferent
between providing and not providing the good:
1− c = σ(tF )
Player F must also be randomizing or else G would not be randomizing.
1− c = 1− (1− σ(tG))(1− σ(tB)) ≥ 1− (1− σ(tG)) = σ(tG)
The two equations above imply that:
σ(tF ) ≥ σ(tG)
but we know from monotonicity that σ(tF ) ≤ σ(tG) so it must be that:
σ(tF ) = σ(tG) = 1− c
and
σ(tB) = 0
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Now tC  tG so
σ(tC) ≤ σ(tG) = 1− c
If σ(tC) = 0 then by optimality σ(tA) = 1 which contradicts monotonicty
as tA  tC . So C must be randomizing. Note also that by monotonicity
σ(tE) ≥ σ(tG). So by optimality σ(tD) = 0. This means that for C to
randomize it must be the case that:
1− c = σ(tA)
Player A must then also be randomizing so:
1− c = 1− (1− σ(tC))2
so
σ(tC) = 1−
√
c < 1− c = σ(tA)
But from monotonicity we know that σ(tC) ≥ σ(tA) so we have a contradic-
tion. This exhausts all possibilities so for this network there does not exist
a symmetric decreasing monotonic equilibrium.
3 The proof
In part (ii) of claim 1 in the proof of proposition 10 it is assumed that
monotonicity of strategies implies that the strategies of players with weakly
higher degrees first order stochastically dominate the strategies of those with
weakly lower degrees. This is true under degree independence but is not
necessarily true otherwise. Monotonicity implies the strategies of players with
weakly higher types first order stochastically dominate the strategies of those
with weakly lower types. In the counterexample above, player A’s neighbours
have degrees as high as those of player B but player B’s neighbours have
higher types than those of player A. Thus, compared to the case when players
only have knowledge of their own degree, knowledge of others’ degrees can
limit what we are able to say about the existence of certain types of equilibria
without strong additional conditions such as degree independence.
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